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THE LEGAL INSIGNIFICANCE OF MOTIVE.
At times, the student of the decisions is startled with declara
tions which seem to import that the mental state which accompanies
an external act, can have no influance upon its legal quality; that
the act has per se such quality, and whether it be good or bad, it
remains good or bad, through all the vicissitudes of feeling, motive
and purpose from which it may spring.
One of the most emphatic, and in this state one of the earliest,
declarations of this class is that of Justice Black in Jenkins v.
Fowler.' Between A's and B's land ran a road. They agreed to
exteud their fences, which were perpendicular to this road, until
they should meet at its middle line, in this way avoiding the necessity of constructing fences along the sides of the road. They built
no partition fence. Crops were planted by both. After B had taken in his crop and before A's had been cut, B removed the part. of
the fence on his own land which lhe had built within the road. The
result was that cattle got into A's field injuring his crop. The road
was a public road and the contract to build the fence across it inclosing it in the field, was illegal. A had no right of action for its
breaci, but the trial court allowed the jury to find damages, if B
"acted from a wicked and wanton purpose to do the plaintiff in24 Pa. 3,8.

In Bonsail v. Reapan, 7 Del. 545, a demurrer to a com-

rlaint was sustained (by Hemphill, P. J.) which alleged that defendan
maliciously induced plaintiff's employer to dismiss him but alleged no
misrcrresentation, no oppressive combination or conspiracy, and no breach
by the employer of any non-terminable contract.
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jury." It returned a verdict of $8.00. The judgment was reversed,
Black. J., saying "In such a case we cannot take cognizance of mer,_L

feelings and motives. These considerations may and do often
aggravate the character of wrongs. Malicious motives make a
bad act worse; but they cannot make that wrong, which, in its
essence is lawful.

* * *

In short, any transaction which would be

lawful and proper if the parties were friends, cannot be made
the foundation of an action merely because they happened to be
enemies. As long as a man keeps himself within the law, by doing
no aol which violates it, we must leave his motives to Him who
searches the heart."
Malicious motives "cannot make that wrong which in its own
essence, is lawful." If this means that that which is lawful is lawful, A is an incontrovertible proposition. If an act, irrespective of
and despite the particular motive with which it is done, has the
quality of legal rectitude, it has that legal quality. No sane person
would ever dispute this. But, it is a singularly absurd assumption
that external acts have legal qualities irrespective of the state of
mind of the actor. A stroke, with one intention or feeling, is an,
assault and battery, with another, it is wholly innocent. A mortal
shot, with the intention to produce death, and with malice, is murder of the first degree. Without the intention the same shot is less

than murder of this degree. Without the malice, it is less than any
degyee of murder. The act of writing the name of another, without
his 0athority, to a document, is or is not forgery, as it is, or is not,

produced by a fraudulent intent. False representations made to
induce and actually inducing X to part with goods or money, are
crim.nal or not, as they are or are not made with the intention to
cheat and defraud. A. man giveg a false alarm of fire from a fire
alarm telegraph. Is he guilty of a crime? Yes, if he knew it was
false. No, if he did not know that it was false. Breaking into a
dwelling house, at night with the intention therein to commit a feloiry is burglary. The same act, without that intent, is not burglary.
A man sets fire to a house withour intention to burn it; he does the
smne external act, but without that intention. Has he committed
the game crime? A man in order to save the life of a woman causes
an abortion. He does the same acts but not with that object. Have
his acts been equally criminal? But why prolng the list of ou?
suppositions? So far from true is it that motives, intentions, etc.,
do not make the external act wrong which without them would be

innocent, that it may be said that there are comparatively few
crimes the components of which are not mental states as well as
external acts.
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The suggestion that motives are left by the law to "lim who
searches the heart," is puerile. The search for motives is a frequent
phenomenon, in cases of crime, even when no particular motive or
object is an ingredient of it. 1 But the casas are very many in which
a particular animus is a constituent, and the commonwealth, imitating the Supreme Heart-searcher, itself undertakes, through its
agents, to search for and discover it. What is it that converts an
act into an attempt at robbery, murder, rape, arson, etc .,but the intended though unrealized effect? A picks up B's watch, which is
lying on a table. What does he (lo it for? To hand it to B? To
sell it and appropriate the purchaese money? The intention makes
the Jdifference between a praiseworthy act, and a larceny. But where
is the intention? Not in the external act, surely; but in what Justice Black is pleased to call the "heart." The prosecutor, the district attorney, the grand jury, thc petit jury are all searchers of
this -'heart."
'\ot of crime only is a mental state a necessary ingredient.
Various so-called torts consist of :tcts produced by, or accompanied
by particular mental states. Writing defamatory words, will or
will not be a libel, according to the presence or absence of malice.
Malicious prosecution, as its name imports, exists only when the
prosecution was begotten of malice. The tort of assault and battery is not committed by accident. "There must always be an intent" to commit it. "2 The right which this tort violates is thus de-

fined by Holland: 3 "A man has a right not to be touched, pushed
or struck in a rude or. hostile manner, thus sustaining a 'battery' in
English law. This right is not interfered with by one who is pushing his way gently in a crowd, or who touches his neighbor to attract his attention, or gives him a jocular and friendly blow, or is
duly executing legal process." The same writer informs us that
wrongful acts may be classified on several principles, one of which
is according to the state of the will of the wrongdoer which may
and (c) such
be (a) entirely absent, (b) such as exhibits negligence,
4
as exhibits intention, sometimes called malice.
It is plain that the real question before the Court in Jenkins v.
Fowler was, shall B, who has a right to tear down his fence, if his
dc.sirn, and object are something elke than the hurt of A, have the
right to tear it down, when he .c ires that hurt, and that hurt is
his ouly object? And this question is not answered by chatter about
iLanahan v. Comm., 84 Pa. 80.
2Cooley, Torts, p. 189.
sElements
of Jurisprudence, p.
4
1d. p. 290.

b2.
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bad motives making that wrong, which in its essence, is lawful.
What we want to know is, whether the external act must be coupled
with "he motive, in order to classify it as legally permissible or impermissible. We are not enlightened by assuming that the legal
qualiiy of the act depends wholly on its external, and not at all,
upon its subjective elements. For the principle that, if an external
act can ever be right, it cannot become wrong because of the motive,
intenlion, object with which it is ,lone, Jenkins v. Fowler cannot be
an authority, for that principle would run athwart half the law of
the land, and it would be stupid and pernicious beyond all toleration. The case must be taken for what it really teaches, which is
nothing else than this ;-when B takes up his own fence on his own
land, lie does what he has a right to do, although he does it merely
in order to injure A, and although his doing it, does cause the injury to A. When this is translated into the proposition, if B, without malice towards A, may do any given external act, he may with
equal impunity do it with malice towards A, it becomes a stupen.
dous absurdity.
Jenkins v. Fowler was again before the supreme court, 1 and
Woodward, J., was so well pleased with the former decision, that
he says that even if the road was not a lawful road, and the contract between A and B, to erec: the fences was therefore valid,
"then the defendant had a right to throw down the fence on his own
land,z and even a malicious exercise of this right would give the
plaintiff no cause of action."
In Wilson v. Berg,3 the question was whether an assignment
for the benefit of creditors was valid because it was made with a
bad ulterior intent, viz., to hinder and delay creditors. Mercur, J.,
says, "In as far as it hinders or delays creditors, it is a lawful hindrance and delay, and cannot be held fraudulent. The commission
of a lawful act is not made unlawful by the fact that it proceeded
from a malicious motive." The question was, is an assignment
made in order to hinder and delay creditors, lawful, and the answer
is, the doing of a lawful act is not made unlawful, etc., a circuitous
way, no doubt, of saying, if the assignment without this object is
valid, an assignment with this object is valid. It might equally
well be said, a grant of land by A to B, being valid, if no fraud on
A's creditors is intended, it is valid, despite the presence of such an
intention, a proposition which every tyro in the law knows to be
2

2S Pa. 176.
Despite his contract.
SS Pa. 167.

But why?

We are not cnlightened.
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false. The principle stated was wholly unnecessary to the decision.
It was enough to say that the law sustains assignments although an
effect and an intended effect may be the hindering certain creditors
from obtaining speedy and preferential payment.
A had manufactured pigs of iron, stamping them with the
word Glendon, the name of the borough where the business was
conducted. B began a similar business in the same borough, and
stamped his pigs of iron with the same word. The master found
that 13 did this for the purpose of imitating A. A's bill to enjoin
against this use of the word was dismissed. In affirming, Mercur,
J., asserts the equality of the right of B with that of A, to use the
name of the borough where the business was conducted, and to the
suggestion that ,B's use was an imitation of A's, he replies, "The
commission of a lawful act does not become actionable, although it
may proceed fTom a malicious motive," a wholly meaningless
dictum. If the act is lawful, irrespective of its motive, it is lawful.
The commission of a lawful act is the commission of a lawful act.
The commission of a lawf-ul act is the commission of a non-actionable act. What a flood of light these and similar phrases cast upon
a discussion! The plain question is, is B's use of a trade mark,
which, but for the purpose in usng it, of securing purchases from
persons who would confound B's wares with A's, would be lawful,
lawful even when that is the purpose? This cannot be answered
by the absurd generalization that the legality of an external act
is not affected by the subjective states which accompany it.
B having improperly removed a portion of the line fence
separating his land from A's. and leaving a gap through which
cattle could enter A's land, A in order to exclude the cattle extended his fence upon B's land. In so doing he was a trespasser.
and B having the right to do so, removed his fence. "This being
a lawful act," says Mercur, J., reversing the judgment of the
Court below, "no action would lie against him therefor, although
his motive thereto may have been malicious," which means simp
ly. that B may remove from his land a structure put on it by A.,
although in doing so, he may have a malicious motive. Unfortunately, we have here a repetition of the generalization, an act.
being lawful, the doing of it even from a malicious motive, is
not unlawful.

2

The law criminal and civil, is, as suggested above, full of cases
in which the criminal or tortious cast of an act is made to depend
Glendon Iron Works v. Uhler, 75 Pa. 467.
2Smith v. Johnson, 76 Pa. 191.
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on the presence of certain reprehensible intentions and feelings.
There is a series of cases in which the lawfulness of the use of
one's property in certain ways is assumed to rest on the benevolence, or at least the non-malevolence, of motive. An upper millowner built a dam and by it detained the water for the operation
of his mill. The result was that the lower mill owner, whose
mill was 30 years older, was for long seasons deprived of the
water. Holding that the anteriority of the erection of the mill,
did not entitle its owner to the abstinence by upper riparian land
owncrs, from the erection and operation of mills, the trial court
told the jury that "if the water was detained carelessly or malic.
iousiy to the injury of Hoy, (the plaintiff, the lower mill owner)
the plaintiff was entitled to recover." The jury found for the
defendant, that is, it negatived malice. In affirming, Rogers, J.
remarks "It is very true, as the court states that if there was :
vexatious detaining of the water, or if there was any degree of
malevolence as to the time, or the quantity o4 water discharged
by Srterrett, it was an injury for which the plaintiff was entitle
to relief in damages." In the opinion of Rogers, then, Sterrett
the upper mill owner, could lawfully detain the water for one
object, under the influence of one motive, and not for another
object. or actuated by another motive. If he kept the water back,
in order to operate his mill and without unfriendly reference to
Hoy, he was guiltless; otherwise he was guilty of a wrong.'
A tanner used a spring of water on his premises. His neighbor having discovered a copper mine on his land, sank a shaft,
in order to extract the ore. The water was pumped out and
the tanyard spring ceased to flow. The spring being fed by no
stream from X's land but by percolations, it was held that the
tanner was not entitled to damages. Lewis, C. J., quotes from the
civil law, the doctrine that he who makes a new work on his
land is not answerable for the damage which his neighbors sustain thereby, "unless it be that be made that change merely with
a view to hurt others without any advantage to himself." He
adds, "Neither the civil law nor the common law permits a man
to be deprived of a well or spring or stream of water for the
mere gratification of malice." He rmaiks that in the case there
was no "testimony tending to sho- either malice or negligence
in conducting the mining operations.'" A similar decision was
reached in Haldeman vs. Bruckhardt,' in which Strong, J., thus
I Hoy vs. Sterrett, 2 W. 32i7.
2Wheatley vs. Baugh, 25 528.
445 Pa. 514.
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states the doctrine in Wheatley vs. Baugh; "Where a spring dependeh for its supply upon the filtrations or percolations of water
through the land of an owner above, and in the use of the land
for mining or other lawful purposes the spring is destroyed, such
owner is not liable for the damages thus caused to the proprietors
of the spring, unless the injury was occasioned by malice or neghgcnce." Later, he says, "We are not however to be understood
as intimating that an owner may maliciously or negligently divert
even an unknown subterranean stream, to the damage of a lower
proprietor. * * * Applying these principles to the present case
we are constrained to say we see no evidence of malice or negligence on the part of the defendants." Similar is the doctrine of
Lybe's Appeal. '
There are cases which alluw B, in operating works of various
sorts on his own land, to do act which will inflict hurt upon A,
provided that the hurt could not be averted by B, if, desirous to
prevent this hurt, he adopted reasonable precautions.
Thus.
B, may drill a gas well even though the effect is to cause salt
watei to rise and corrupt the stream of water which his neighbor
uses, if by reasonable expenditure, under the influence of a proper
regard for A, he could not prevent this result, but if he could
thus prevent it, he would be responsible for not doing so. B's
liability is put on the ground of his negligence, and this is de
fined by Mitchell, J., to be "the absence of such care, and r7
gard for the rights of others, as a prudent and just man would,
and should have in the same situation."
Regardlessness of the
rights of others, is very nearly aikin to malice. Seemingly, thern
the liability will depend on the presence or absence of malice, or
indifference to the interests of others. In the same case, heard
again in the Supreme Court.' Williams, J., remarks, "The defendant had a right to drill in search of natural gas, but it was
bound to exercise this right in a reasonable manner, and with due
regard to the rights of others." "The ground of the defendant's
liability is negligence, the want of reasonable care under the circumstances, for the rights of oti/ers." Defective altruism, a species of negative malevolence, loving one's self overmuch, and one's
neighbor too little, is the gravanien. Mischief done with this regard for others, would be lawful: done without it, avoidable with
it. this same mischief is actionable.
106 Pa, 626; Cf. Williams vs. Ladew, 161 Pa. 283.
'Collins v. Chartiers v. Gas Co., 131 Pa. 143.
3139 Pa. 111. Cf. McGettigan v. Potts, 149 Pa. 155;
& Iron Co. 201 Pa. 70 respecting laterai support.

Matulya v. Coal
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When the same act can be produced by non-malevolent as well
as by malevolent motives, it woald always be prudent to insist
on rather clear evidence that the motive was of the latter class,
before allowing a recovery, but the risk of mistake in interpreting motives in this set of cases -s no greater than in numberless
others. As a man has no right to swing his arm towards another,
with a view to striking him, though he owns his arm, the legal
quality of the movement of the arm depending on the intended
effect of it, so he should not be allowed to do acts upon his land,
if the intended effect is to annoy and incommode another, although
the land and the muscles are his. A constant aim of the law is
to prevent activities intended to effect hurt, while allowing those
which are not thus designed; penalizing attempts at crime; pen.
alizing external acts when they are begotten of certain motiVes
and objects. There is no appreciable reason, after saying that although an act will annoy and hurt another, it may be done, when
that annoyance and hurt are not the object sought, but are only incidental to some other and legitimate object, for refusing to say
that it may not be done when, if the annoyance and hurt were not
desired, it would be refrained from. A man is allowed to pub.lish a defamation. when, in certain cases, he seeks to accomplish
legitimate ends, although by so doing, he hurts the reputation of
the subject of it; whereas he is not allowed to publish it, if his
object is merely this injury to the reputation. We are often al.
lowed to do harm to one man that good may come to another or
even to ourselves.
This is no reason for allowing us to do evil to a man, simply
for the sake of doing evil to him. And to say that one has a right
to do the act which produces the evil in order that it may produce that evil, is simply to beg the question. No acts are effectless nor causeless. It is a good Dolicy of the law to prevent the
acts, howevet unobjectionable in themselves, that work bad effects.
and to forbid acts when prompted by malice, which are allowed
when not so prompted, is simply a way of forbidding acts which
produce intended mischief, while allowing acts which do not produce it. In Jenkins v. Fowler what was proposed by the plaintiff
was to censure by damages, the infliction of aloss on him by the
defendant by means of an act which was adopted merely in order
to produce that loss. To sever the physical act of removing the
fence from the internal reason for doing it., and from the effect
intentionally wrought by it, is not far removed from imbecility
The firing of a gun, innocent in itself, might as well be separate
from the desire and intent to kill. with which it is done, and from
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the death which is the predestined effect.
The murderer does
nothing but shoot. le uses his own gun, his own powder and ball,
his own eye, his own hand. The death, it is true, is an effect, and
it is disagreeable to the victim. The death is also intended. But
the act of shooting is lawful "in its own essence." How then can
malicious motives make it wrong? Tearing up one's fence is "in
its essence" lawful, says Black, J., which, if it means anything
means, that in the abstract without additional circumstances, it is
lawful. But it never exists exceot with additional circumstances
and sometimes these leave the act commendable, sometimes neutral
but sometimes morally reprehensible. When they make it repre
hensible, why should there not be a legal responsibility for it?
The principle is easily understood that when a man does an
act not in order to gratify some proper personal or social feeling,
but solely in order to tease, annoy, and injure another, he commits
a wrong although the same act done without malevolence, would
be innocent. It is a principle -widely operative in every system
of jurisprudence.
The difficulty of detecting motives is more or less serious. So
often' is that of detecting the commission of the external act. Nor
has it been great enough to deter civilized men from incorporating
into their definitions of crimes and torts, intentions and feelings
as well as physical acts. Men are hung or incarcerated weekly for
intentions, or for feelings when coupled with acts. In a large proportion of cases, a jury may attain a reasonable certainty concrrning the motive and ultimate intent of an act. Had B, in
Jenkins v. Fowler, admitted, boasted, that he took his fence
down, in order to injure A, it would surely not have been unwise
to believe him. The circumstances or manner of the act might
leave the motive equally apparent. There was no complaint irt
the case, that the evidence did not justify the jury's finding tho
malice.
When an appreciable pecuniary or proprietary disadvantage
is both sought and effected by X's act, he should be made responsible for it. The act is a means. Colorless itself, it derives
a tortious cast from the end which it is performed to realize.
Whether a man so manipulates his own fence or his foot, his arm
his power of speaking and writing, as to hurt another, and for
the purpose of hurting another, he should understand that he is
liable for the result. He should kmow that though the external
act "in its own essence" is not unlawful, it becomes umlawful when
performed in order to harm others.
Wr.zwA Ticm=rz.
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MOOT COURT
CLARK vs. BANKS.

Trespass by Dogs-Liability of Owner-Act of April 14, 1351, Section t"$
Construed.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Banks was leading a valuable Irish setter by a chain when his dog was
attacked by an ownerless bull-dog of savage dis-osition. Banks's dog broke
loose and was pursued for some blocks by the bull-dog. Having finally escaped he took the shortest cut to his master. In doing so he crossed a lot
in which Clark grew rare orchids and did scrious damage. This is trespass
for the damage.
Reed for the plaintiff.
An owner of domestic animals is liable for their trespasses without
knowledge of the viciousness of the apiwal. Am. & Eng. Encv. of Law,
Vol. 2 p. 365; Dolnh vs. Ferris. 7W. & S. 369; Chunot vs. Sanson, 43
Wis. 536; Act of April 14, 1845.
Roush for the defendant.
.... An owncr of a dog is not liable for his trespasses at common law.
King vs. Kline, 6 Pa. 318; Goodman vs. Gay, 15 Pa. 188; Ro." vs. Slack,
7 Pa. 254.
The jumping of a dog Into the field of another is rot a trespass for
which an action can be maintained. Brum vs. Giles. 12 Ene. C. L. R. 79;
Mason vs.Keeling, 11 William III (Ames Cases Torts p 407.)
OPINION OF THE COURT.
DUFFY, J.:-Banks was leading a valualble Irish setter by a chain when
his dog was attacked by an ownerless bull-dog of savage disposition. Banks'
dog broke loose and was pursued for some blocks by the bull-dog. Havinj
finally escaped, he took the shortest cut to his master. In doing so he
crossed a lot in which Clark grew rare orchids and dil serious damage.
It appears that at common law, owners of dogs were not responsible for th i
acts or trespasses of their dogs on the land of another.
Property In a dog is of a peculiar character. "A man Is not by the common law, considered to Iave the same valuable property in a dog as in
cattle and sheep; and it has been held that if a man's dog goes into hit
neighbor's garden, and spoils and injures his erors, no action will lie, unless
the dog is -of a peculiarly mischievous disrosition so as to b unfit to be at
large, and this is known to the master." Addison on Tortq 267.
In the case of Beckwith vs. Chariicke & Hatch (12 Ene. C. L. Renorts
118) the court laid down the rule, that, "if a person goes along a foot-hath
and his dog happens to escape from him and run into a paddock, and pull
down a deer, against his will, it is not Lre.,ass" In this case the question
was much argued whether the owner of a dog is answerable in tresnass fov
every nnauthorized entry of the animal into the land of another, as In the
case of an ox, and reasons were offered, which we need not now estimate, for
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a distinction in this respect between oxen, and dogs or cats, on account, first.
of the difficulty, or impossibility of keeping under restraint; secondly, the
slightiess of the damage which their wanderings ordinarily cause; thirdly,
the common usage of mankind to allow them a wider liberty; and lastly
their not being considered in law so absolutely the property of the owner
as to bc the subject of larceny. In Brown vs. Gilles (12 Eng. C. L. Reports,
118) Park J., was of the opinion; that a dog jumping into a field without
Ihe consent of its master, not only wag nota wilful trcspass, but was no trespass at all on which an action could be maintaine."
In Henry vs. Mulheam 1 Dist. Reports, 607 it was held, "that to sustain
an action for an injury committed by a dog in the absence of its owner, and
without his agency, it is necessary to prove the mischievous propensities of
the dog, and that the owner had notice thereof."
In Goodman vs. Gay, 15 Pa. 188. the court said: "There are English
cases, undoubtedly, and some American cases which hold that the owner o!
domestic animals is not liable for injuries they may commit unless he knew
they were vicious; but thesa cases generally are in relation to dogs, a domcstic animal which every body in every place owns and keeps, and suffers
to go at large. The custom has maae the practice lawful, unless where it
has been interdicted with statute, which has been done to some extent in,
our State and within that interdict, It has been held that the owner '.I ho
does not chain or house up his dogs, is liable for the injuries they commit
whether he knew they were addicted to killing sheep or not." It would thus
seem that the common law Nests In a reputabl3 dog the right of going and
coming where he listetb, so long as he does not invade that territory which
has been covered by statute, without charging his master for trespass. This
view of a dog's license appears to be quite old. Let us now look into the
matter and see now far the rights of a dog under the common law have
bef.n restricted by statute in Pennsylvania and how far the rights of an.
owner have been increased so as to rrotect him in his property in dogs, also
to sibject him to liability for the acts of the dog.
We have first the act of assembly of Apr. 14, 1851. which provides that:
"The owner or owners of any dog or dogs shall be liable for all damages
done or caused to be done by any and every such dog or dogs, in an action
of trespass vi et armis, In the name of the person or persons injured."
Next we have the act lo assembly of May 15, 1889, P. L. 222, section 6,
entitled "An act for taxation of dogs and rrotectlon of sheep;" and lastly
we have the act of assembly of May 25, 1893, making dogs personal property
and the subject of larceny.
It will be seen from the above stacutcs that the avowed intention of the
legislature was to increase the liability of the owners of dogs, and 'to protect
him ln his right of property in the sime.
But even with this increasod liability. imposed by statute, the common
law, except in so far as renealed by 1he above statutes remains in force in
this state. and as the liability of an owner of a dog for trespacs was unknown
to the common law. and as the statutory provisions on which this liability
has been increased and enlarged are in derogation of the common law, they
must be strictly construed and cannot be extended beyond their terms. The
court cannot alter the clearly exuressed language of the above statutes by
reading into. or having them cover more than is expressed or contained In
them: and if the legislature intended to change -the common law so far as
to make dogs, "subject to taxation," "owners liable for treopass vi et armis,"

110

THE

FORUM

and **the subject of larceny" then that part, and only that part of the com
mon law is superseded by statute, and the other feature of the common law
must remain in force until such time as the iegis'ature sees fit, or deems "€
necessary or expcdicnt, to tal-e up the matter, and make an owner of a doi
iable for its trespasses in. he same manner as they have made "dogs pefsonal property, and subjects of larceny owners liable fcr trespass vi et armis
taxation of dogs and protection of sheep."
This is not like the case where the owner 4%-as a trespasser and the dog
carried into a field, in which case, should the
accompanied the owner or ivao:
dog kill sheep or injure them, this though the first offense, may be stated
and proved as an aggravati.eq of the trespass. Dolph v. Ferris, 7 W. & S.
369.
From the facts in this case, it appears the owner was exercising all possible care; his dog was chained, and the owner held him by the chain; he
occupied the street which he had a perfect right to do, his act was innocent
in itself, and from which n,) person could reasonably infer that injury or
damages would follow, and which when it did happen was rather the result
of accident or misadventure than design.
In Mason v. Keeling, ILd. Raymond 606,.the court held: "The owner
of a dog Is not liable for injrry done by him, unless there has been some
sort of concurrence, or trespass on te owncr's part, or knowledge of th e
dog's mischievous nature. The law coEs not oblige the owner to keep the
dog In his house; for if the dog break into a neighbor's close, the owner,
will not be subject to it."
trespass quare clausum fregit. NegliThe compiaint in this case Is in
gence of the owner is not ave.rred. The law in relation to dogs is in some
respects, distinguishable from that in relation to other domestic animals.
except in so far as change,1 by statute, the owners are not liable. Th
cases relied on by the defence, viz., Doyle v. Vance, 6 Vic. Law cases, 87,
Chunot v. Lawson, 43 Wis. 536, as being a departure from the common law
rule as to dogs, were cases, the rormer In which a dog ran after a horse in
the piaintiff's field and the horse taking fright, leaped over a fence and broke
his neck; the latter was a case in which a dog attacked a cow in plaintiff'I
field and killed it; and while there were dicta in the former case that the
owner of a dog should -be held for his trespasses generally; the case would
not be law in Pennsylvania in an action in trespass q. c. f., bdt it does show
that the modern tendency in those jurisdictions is to break away from the
common law rule, and the old custom in the matter of the exoneration of owners or dogs for their trespasses. There is no reason at the present time
why the rule in regard to dogs shouli not be changed, as the causes enumerated for his owner's being relieved of liability have ceased in a great measure to exist; but if there .!? reason, (and thcre seems to be,) to alter the
law the legislature must do -t not the court.
There being no statute in Pennsylvania making an owner of a dog liable
for its trespasses quare clausum fregit, we must apply the common law, and
direct a verdict for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
A parent Is not civilly responsible for the torts of his minor children
although he has brought them into bfing, and maintains and controls them.
own
Tiffany, Domestic Rel. 239; but this may b 'in part Justified by their
406.
Id
liability for their torts.
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A horse, cow, or dog is not responsible itself, except in special cases;
e. g. when for sheep-killing, the dog may be put to death by the owner of
the sheep. Nevertheless, he who owns or keeps and maintains the animal
is, within limits, deemed responsible for its acts. The ground of the liability
is not precisely defined. Is it that its torts would not be possible had it
not een conserved, or kepc in the wocality where it was? Is it because.
having exercised power over it, the owner or custodian should be required
to exercise enough power to prevent its committing noxious deeds? That
the bend of ownership is not necessary, is clear. Not only the owner, but
the agister, the bailee, may be liable. It is not the ownership, but the possession and use, says Thompson, J., that create the liability. Rossell v.
Cottom, 31 Pa. 525. In Snyder v. Patterson, 161 Pa. 98, the uncle with
whom a boy lived, and who allowed the boy to keep his dog at the
house, was held liable for the dog's misconduct. Cf. Mann v. Weiand, 81/
Pa 243. In the case before us, the dng is described as Banks' dog, and he
ha.i it in charge immedlately prior to its escape. The connection between
him and it, is sufficient to support his responsibility for its act.
On account of the notoriousness of the propensity of horses, cows, sheep.
and pigs to rove, the owner is bound to know it, and at all hazards, to confine them on his land. Cooly Torts, 402. If they break into A's rlose, an.l
injure his grass, he is liable for the trc.,pass; Dolph v. Ferris, 7 W. & S. 367
Thst dogs rove even more than sheep or horses, is known. to every body. If
his control of a horse Imposes on X fine duty of preventing its trespassing,
Is there any reason for saying that the same relation to a dog, sh'll not impose the same duty? Yet there are at least dicta, to the effect that a dog may
trespass without making his master guilty of the trespass, while a horse, or
cow, or goat, or sheep may not. "If a dog" says C. J. Holt, "breaks a neighbor's close, his owner will not be subject to an action." Mason v. Keeling,
Lord Raymond 608.
M ller, J., Reed v. Edwards 17 C B. (N. S.) 245, enumerates, without
appraising them, reasons urged for giving this impunity to the owner of a
dog. (1) The greater difficulty of keeping the dog under restraint. That
would be an excellent reason for dis,lensing with the dog, or making compeusation to those who suffer damage from his trespasses. He is not for
many persons, as necessary as a horse or a cow, and it would not be severe to require those who find him muecessary, to invent a way of preventing his roving, or to indemnify those who suffer from his vagaries. (2) The
sligbness of the damage ordinarily caused by the tres-ass of a dog. A good
enough reason for refusing compensalion when the damage is trivial; but
a very poor reason for refusing it, when the damage is considerable. When
a loss of $50 or $100 is caused by the trespass, what solace is it to the sufferer to know that canine trespasses arc net usually so injurious? (3) It is
usual to allow dogs to rove over the premises of others. Eloquent judges
have often replied to similar suga'estions. "mal i. tsus abolen4 -"est." But all
that is meant is that people usually rose-t with nothing worse than a growl
or a scowl, the trespasses of their nei:;hbor's dogs. because, usually, such
tresrasses cause no appreciable damage. But is It usual for men to bear
serious losses inflicted by dogs, without seking redress? (4) Strangest o!
reasons is this, that dogs are not considered so absolutely uronerty, as to
be the subject of larceny. Williams, J., sensibly remarked in Cox v. Burbridge. 13 C. B. 430, "I cannot s"e what difference it can make whether
the animal is or is not one In which a man may have a valuable property."
One might well suppose, if immunity from liability was to be conceded in
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any ease, it would be with respect to trespasses of animals esteemed highly
enough to be protectable as property.
We have not noticed any recognition of this distinction in this state.
In Rossell v. Cottom, 31 Pa. 525, Thompson, J., seems unconscious of any
distinction between a bull, a dog and a horse, and he applies the wholesome
injuiction " sic utere tio ut alicntu4 non laedas" to all. In King v. Kline, 6
Pa. 318 Coulter, J., intimates dissent from C. J. Holt's opinion that the
dog's trespass is without responsibility.
When a dog has performea a specially vicious act; has, e.g. bitten a
person, the master's liability is put on the same ground as that for the
vicious act of any other animal. If the master had notice of the propensity,
he will be liable. Cf. Dolph v. Ferrfs, 7 W. & S. 367 (a bull goring a horse)
Campbell v. Brown, 19 Pa. 359, (dog killing sheep) Paff v. Slack, 7 Pa. 254
(the -ame) Sylvester v. Maag, 155. Pa. 225, (dog biting man,) Snyder v.
Patterson, 161 Pa. 98, (dog biting boy.) Henry v. Mulherrin, 1 Dist. 637,
(dog kills goose.) Mann v. Weiand,81'/ 2 Pa. 243 (dog frightening horse on
If the same principle applies to the special vices of particular
highway.)
dogs, horses, cows, and the injuries r.-ulting from them, it is hard to see
why one principle should regulate iesponsibility for the ordinary consequences of the universal vices of horses, cows, goats, sheep, pigs, chickens,
m-nd another that for the same consequences of the universal vices of dog:
or cats. Every horse will rove, if not confined, and trespass on land. Every
deg will do the same. The vice is common to the whole species. But, th3
horse's trespass is his master's trespass, and the dog's trespass is, we are
asked to think, not his master's trespass.
it may well be that, as the ordinary trespass of the dog results in no
appreciable damage, it is wise to deny the action of trespass except whlen
such damage exists, on the principle of "de minimis non curat lex," but that
principle would be no warrant for denying redress when serious damage
has resulted.
Something could be said for the principle that, as the dog, and cat are
sm1l animals and as their trespasses rarely produce serious injury, theIr
mere breaking of the close of X shall in no case support an action by him
against the owner, but when the invasion of the close is accompanied by
s-rious injury, that principle would not apply.
The dog has had his admirers in all ages. His friendship has given
solace to many a forsaken man. Among human beings, so selfish, false and
This
treacherous, his name is a synonym of fidelity and devotion.
accounts for his popularity. He Is "a domestic animal," said Coulter,
J., in Goodman v. Gay, 15 Pa. 188, "which every body in every place owns
and keeps, and suffers to go at large. The custom is almost as old as time
for Tobit had his dog," an extravagance, in which the judge seldom indulged for Tobit was not almost as old as time, since his history does not
begin till about 760 B. C., and time began several billions of years ago:
nor could it be safely inferred, from Tobit's baying a dog that it was a
"custom" to have a dog; nor was it tiue in 1850, when the justice wrote,
that "every body in every place, owns and keeps" a dog. There were sev
eral millions of people in the United States that did not. But the same
judge in King v. Kline, 6 Pa. 318, had said, "A dog is a useful animal but
he must be taught useful qualities and innocent habits by his master. * * *
A dog Is not to be kept for the purpose of destroying the pronerty of neighbors." Those who appreciate the dog, ought not to be unwilling to compeusate persons who suffer from their ndulgence in this taste. Article 1385
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of the Code Napoleon prescribes that "the owner of an animal or he who
uses it, Is responsible, during his use ol it, for the damage which the animal
has caused, whether it was In his care, or had escaped and roved away."
49 L'w Times, 181. In Doyle v. Vance, 6 Victorian Law. Rep. 87, the principle is fully admitted, that If a dog Lrespasses on X's land and there commits a damage, e. g. causes a horse to run and thus break its neck, his owner will be liable for the trespass on the land, and the resulting damage.
That a dog In wandering over the country, may without special vice,
commit injury, Is aplparent to all. He goes regardless of boundary lines:
and .be has no more respect for an oichid than for a dandelion.
When a trespass is committed by a domestic animal on the land of another than its owner, and it there attacks animals, or otherwise injures
property, it is not necessary that its disposition to commit such acts should
have been known to its owner, In order to make him responsible. Van
Louver v. Lyke, 1 N. Y. 518; Cooly, Torts, 400. Had the destruction of the
orchids by the defendant's dog been the result of some peculiar propensity.
rot known to the owner he would have been liable. But It was not due to
any such propensity. It was due to the well known disposition to trot over
all sorts of ground, grass or flower-bed, heedless of results.
A few cases have recognized the principle that If horses or cattle while
being driven along a highway, escape from the driver or custodian, and
run nr walk Into adjacent premises, the driver will not be liable for the
tresprss, or even for damages, though serious, caused by the trespassing
animal, if he was not negligent, wheT, the escape occurred, In his efforts
to retake them. Cooly, Torts, 401 Goodwyn v. Cheveley, 4 H. & N. 631
In Tillett v. Ward, L. R. 10 Q. B. D. 17, an ox driven along a street, darted
through the open door of a slaop, and caused damage therein to the extenz
of one pound. The defendant not being negligent, no recovery was permitted. It is bard to discover justification fcr such an exception. The liability for an ordinary trespass of a horse or bull does not depend upon the
• egligence of the defendant. Tillet v. Ward, supra, Ellis v. Loftus Iron
Works L. R. 10 C. P. 10; Cooly, Tors, 397; Doyle v. Vance, supra; Cox v.
Burbridge, 13 C. B. 430; How can it matter whether the owner was carefully keeping the animal rithin the paddock, or field, or was carefully conducting him along a highway? He had a right to do both. If, keeping the
animal carefully in the field, the owner is liable If it escapes Into the field of
another, why, carefully managing it on a highway, should he not be liable, if It
escapes into the field or premises of another? If the care required by the
cireutnstances is present, it ought to exonerate In both cases, If In either.
In both cases the plaintiff's loss Is the result of an escape, not contributed
to by the carelessness of the defendant. In both cases, it Is incident to a
tresp.ss. There would be no horses on highways If there were none in
stables or fields. It is as necessary that they should some times be In the
latter, as that. at other times, they shculd be in the former. It Is just as
impolitic to make the owner liable for an escape from the former, as for an
escape from the latter. We are not able to accent the distinction between
a trespass arising from an escape froml the master's premises, and one arising from an escape from a highway. In both cases the trespass should
be attended with liability without regard to the presence or absence of negligence.
But. even if we conceded the principle that an escape from a highway
not conditioned by the owner's negligence, should not impute a liability for
the trespass of the animal upon adjacent premises, we could not grant that
any trespass following such escape, however remote In time and place.
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would fall within it. The place where the dog committed the injury is not
defined. The dog was pursued "some blocks," but whether on the road or
across fields we know n3t. He finally escaped. Where was he then! On
a highway, or in a field? He then took the shortest cut to his master. Was
he now for the first time deserting the highway? How long after an escape from a highway does the immun*y of the master last? Forever? For
injuries caused at what distance from the highway? A mile, two miles?
The 8th section of the act of April 14th, 1851, 1 P. & L. 1655, declares
that "the owner or owners of any dog or dogs shall be liable for all damages
done or caused to be done by any and every such dog or dogs, In an action
of trespass vi et armis, in the name of the person or persons injured, to be
sued far and recovered before any court or justice of the peace having jurisdiction, of the amount so claimed." It may be that the legislature had in
mind only the injuries to the human beings or to animals, their property.
but this is by no means clear. There is no gcod reason for making a dog's
cwner liable for its injuries to other animals, the property of men, and not
for its injuries to other forms of property.
The conclusion we have reached is that the 1os3 caused by the defendant's dog should be bore by him and not the plaintlfi. Qu! sentit commodum
debet et sentir e onwu.'"
Judgment reversed with v. f. d. n.

SCOTT vs. R. R. CO.
Injury By Train at Railroad Crossing-To Stop, Look and Listen is a
Rule of Law-Contributory Negligence
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
In attempting to cross the track of defendant, on a street in a borough
Scot' was run into by a locomotive and seriously hurt. The train was
runn...ag at the rate of fifteen miles per hour when it cres3ed the streer.
The borough contained ten thousand people and the street was the principal business street. The crossing was within two blocks of the busines.
cenLet of the borough. Scot' testified distinctly that he stopped fifteen
feet from the track, looked, listened but saw ahead no train: Eight persnns, four of whom were employees of the company testified as distinctly
that 'hey were observing him and that he neither stopped, nor looked, nor
listened. The court directed a verdict for the defendant. Motion for a
new trial.
Arnold for the plaintiff.
Wallis for the defendant.
When the facts are undisputed, and but one inference regarding the
case of the plaintiff can be drawn from them, the question of contributory
negligence is one of law for the court.Lehigh Valley R. R. 'Co. vs. Greiner,
113 Pa. 600; Reading & Columbia R. R. Co. vs. Ritchie et. al. 102 Pa. 425.
The plaintiff to recover must show that he stopped, looked and listened, and also that the accident was due to no negligence on his part. Pi.
R. R Co. vs. Beall, 73 Pa. 504. Ellis vs. Lake Shore R. R. Co., 27 W. N. C.
145.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
KEENAN, J.:-The facts of this case briefly stated are that the plaintiff, war run .over by a locomotive while. crossing the tracks of the defendant company in a populous town and seriously hurt and aftcr recover-
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Ing brcught this action in the lower court to recover damages for the Injury inflicted.
The learned judge concluding from the evidence that Scott was guilty of contributory negligence directed a verdict for the defendant, anti
the plaintiff now moves for a new trial.
Railroad accidents are constantly occurring and have probably given
rise to nrore litigation than any other one subje3t and some of the law
is yet In such a state of un.ertainty that for a statement of facts as above
there are two different lines of decis'ons. Mitchell, C. J. so aptly sums
that we shall quote him. H-2
diem up in Ely. v. Railway, 158 Pa. 233
says, "The cases beginning with R. R. v. Heileman 49 Pa. 60 and R. R. v,
Beale, 73 Pa. 504 have established ot only the rule that a traveller about
to cross the track must stop, look and listen as an absolute and unbending iule of law founded in public policy for the protection of passengers In
railroad trains, as much as of travellers on the common highways, but
also that such stopping, looking and listening must not be merely nominal
or perfunctory but substantial, careful and adapted in good faith for the
accomplishment of the end in view. Hence the necessary corrollaries of
the rule * "* * that the traveller must stop and look where he can see
and he will not be allowed to say that he did so, when the circumstances
make it plain that the proper exercise of his senses must have shown
him the danger. These principles are settled beyond que3tion, but the
apphcation of them to the Infinite variety of circumstances and evidence
in atcident cases is not always easy. All that the court can do is to lay
down the general rules and to say that where the facts are uncontested
o,- the inference of negligence the only one that can be drawn, the court
must rronounce the result as a matter of law, but where the facts are In
dispute or the inference from them opcn to debate they must go to the
jury. This was also affirmed in Gray vs. Pa. R. R. Co, 172 Pa. 383 and
othe kindred cases. We concur in the above and think it is especially
Scott
appl-cable to this case, as the testimony was not uncontested.
says he st.pped, looked and listened fiftcen feet from the track. Eight
other persons, four of them employees oZ the defendant company say he
did not stop look and listen. Now who is to be believed? Even though
the preponderance of evidence would seem to negative his assertion and'
prove that he w:,s negligent, It was not for the court to say that such
was the case anil thereby take it from the jury.
Dlere is where the learned trial judge erred. Wbile many cases hold.
that n judge ran enter a non-suit against the plaintiff, or direct a verdiet 'or the defendant In all cases waere the facts-are undisputed, or but
onje ;nference can te drawn from tLfm as to the plaintiff's contributory
n'agi:genre. Pa. R. R. Co. vs. Beale. 73 Pa. 5"9, and even in those cases
where -ll the evidence before the jury, with all the inferences they may
reasonablv draw from it, is not sufficient to sustain, a verdict for the pl'intiff and if such verdict were returned it would have to be sit aside; then
the court should direct the jury to return a verilet for the defendant.
Tucl.zLchimkey vs. Coal Co., 199 Pa. 515, yct we believe the court overstepped the line here in as3uming the burden of weighing the evidence,
whet it was contradicted and Imneached, and deciding whether the plain.
tiff was guilty of contributory negligence.
it is a well recognized rule that failure on the nsrt of a traveller cr ossIng a railroad track at grade to ston, look and listen is negligence per
it Is a question for the jury when there exists a reasonable doubt
se, tel
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as to the facts tending to prove negligence or as to the just inference to
be drawn therefrom. McKee v. Bidwell, 74 Pa. 218.
Here the evidence is conflicting as to whether the plaintiff stopped
looked and. listened. It is reasonably certain however that he neither saw
nor heard the rapidly approaching train, because it cannot be presumed
that he would wilfully walk upon the track in front of the train to be
struck. Conceding even for the sake of argument that there was evidence
tending to show that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in
not stopping, that evidence should have been submitted to the jury under
proper instructions as to the principles of law Involved. It Is their exclusive province to consider and weigh the testimony and draw therefrom
such conclusions of fact as in their judgment was warranted without being burdened by an instruction from the court as to how they shall find
theli verdict, when such instruction Is unwarranted ffrom the existing
facts.
Although the weight of evidence may appear very clearly against the
plaintiff it was for the jury to so decide and not for the court. We have
in mind one case where it was allowed to be deided by the jury, even
though the plaintiff's own witnesses made contradictory statements. Eby
vs. Pittsburg, Cincinnati & St. Louis Ry. Co, 158 Pa. 233. There it was
held that It was the duty of the jury to reconcile conflicting statements
whet.er of the same or different witnesses, or to draw the line between
them and say which shall prevail.
Was it the court's province to decide that the defendant company was
not guilty of negligence in running trains at the rate of fifteen miles an
hour down the main business street of a borough of ten thousand inhabtants.
The learned counsel who so ably argued this case, has sought to have
the verdict sustained and has cited many cases to convince us of the correctness of the lower court's decision, but in all of his cases one thing
was present, which is, in this case, conspicuous by its ab3ence. There
the evidence was uncontradicted and unimpeached, here it has been con
trad'cted and impeached, leaving to our mind an important difference and
distinction, so that we are constrained to decide in favor of the plaintiff
even though he presented neither argument nor brief.
Motion for a new trial granted.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
the train was running fifteen miles per hour, when it crossed the
principal business street of the borough containing ten thousand people
That such a speed was negligent, the jury might well have found. Whether
it was causally connected with the injury to Soott; whether, but for the
high speed, Scott would have escaped, Is not plain from the evidence.
The evidence as to Scott's stopping, looking and listening for a train
Is contradictory. He testifies that he did. Eight persons as distinctly de.
ny that he did. This preponderance of number was no justification of
the court's refusing to submit the ouestlon. That the plaintiff Is his only
witness, and Is contradicted by others does not deny to him the right to
have his credibility decided by the jury. One man may tell the truth and
eight may lie. Phila. W. & B. R. R. v. Alvord, 128 Pa. 42; Weaver v.
Shaffer v. Clark, 90 Pa. 94: And an interested
Craighead, 104 Pa. 288;
witnesq is not for that reason necessarily to be disbelieved, when he Is
contradicted by witnesses who are disinterested. Platz v. McKean Town
ship, 178 Pa. 601. Holden v. Penna. R. R. 169 Pa. 1 seems to teach that
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if the plaintiff is contradicted by several (five) disinterested witnesses as
to stopping, the court should not submit the question, but as there was an*
other ground for the decision, it is not necessary that, in this respect, we
should accept it as authority.
Scott, however says that he stopred when fifteen feet from the track.
No exllanation is given for his selection of this place. He is silent as
to any other stopping, and the cout, we think, properly assumed that
The court, could also, we think, say that the
there was no other.
rlace selected was too remote from the track. It must be remembered
that Scott was a pedcstrian; and as far as appears, could have halted at
the very verge of the track. This he did not do. He was bound to look
and listen all the time while approaching the tracks within the fifteez
feet. Cf. Gangawer v. Phila. & Reading R. R., 168 Pa. 265.
That he did not thus look and listen is conclusively established by
the fgct that he was struck while within the track. So far as appears.
it was day, when the accident occurred. It is not shown that the track
was curved, that there were standing cars or other obstacles to sight, or
that the plaintiff was deaf or blind. The train was so near him that he
could have seen it, had he looked; he would have heard it, had he listene,. Of the visibility and audibility of a train to one thus related to
it, the court will take judicial notice. The inference is irresistible that
the looking and listening did not occur, or, that despite the seeing and
the hearing, the plaintiff ventured to walk over the tracks. The trial
court did right in directing a verdict for the defendant; Holden v. Penna.
I. R. 169 Pa. 1; Hovenden v. Penna. R. R., 180 Pa. 244.
Judgment reversed.
FIELD vs. ROBINSON.
Power of Wife to Devise a Fee to Husband With a Condition In Partial,
Restraint of Marriage.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
The plaintiff received a devise of a certain tract of land from his wife,
the will containing the following clause:
"I give, devise, and bequeath to my husband, John Fields, his heirs
and assigns forever, all that tract of land situate etc." "provided however
that if he should ever marry Julia Gordon, then the said tract to become
forever."
the property of my niece Elizabeth Stayer, her heirs and assigns
Fields did marry Julia Cordon, and afterwards contracted to sell the
the title
land to the defendant, who refused to perform on the ground that
is defective.
This is an amicable action to test the will.
Braddock for the plaintiff.
A rondition in restraint of marriage is forbidden by law in thP case of
the liberty of
real Pstate. Story on Enuity. p. 288. All conditions against liberty
of manmarriage are unlawful as being in restraint on the natural
Ecc'l Law,
kind, and a hindrance to the propagation of the species. 4 Burns
152.
Flanagan for the defendait.
bugConditions in restraint of marriage are valid when made by the
McCulwife.
the
by
made
when
valid
be
should
band. by analogy thev
lough's Appeal, 12 Pa 197- Com. v. Stauffer, 10 Pa. 350; Grayder's Exr's.
v. Grayder, 23 N. J. Eq. 229.
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OPINION OF THE COURT.
DARNER, J.:-The question arising in this case is whether or not the
plaintiff has such a title in the land in question as will permit him to compel Ihe acceptance of it on the part of the defendant, In accordance wit.i
an agreement to purchase the same.
The title of the plantiff is derived from the will of his wife, which
giver to the plaintiff a fee, with a limitation over to her niece, in the case
that her husband should ever marry Julia Gordon. The husband actually
marrie- the one person designated, and by which act the limitation was to
have effect. The question now arises, did the husband by his marrying
Julia Gordon, become divested of the title in the land, and did It ipso facto
become vested In the niece Elizabeth Stayer.
It has been held that conditions annexed to a gift, in total restraint or
mairiage are void, both at civil and common law, but that rule has been
so modified as to permit partial or reasonable restraint of marriage, especially when the restraint is as to a particular person, and the subject o
the restraint was realty. In some states there are statutory provisions,
whic1 make both the condition or the devise void, or either, or perhaps
as in Indiana in which state the devise Is valid and the condition Is void
But i Pennsylvania no statutory provisions have been made in respect to
devibes of realty with conditions attached in restraint of marriage eithe.
total or partial.
1i has been the policy of the courts, however, of this state to look witu
favoi upoa devises which are given on condition of a partial restraint of
maniage, in sevIral instances, however, refusing to enforce condition9
which were in total restraint of a second marriage by a widow of the testator.
In Commonwealth v. Stauffer, 10 Pa. 350, there was a total restraint
of marriage of the widow of the t,:stator, with a devis3 over in, case
the condition was broken. Here the court (Gibson, J.,) held that "it
would be extremely difficult to say, why a ,husband should not be at
liberty to leave a homestead to his wife, wthout being compelled to let
her, share it
with a successor to his bed, and to use it as a nest to
hatcL a brood of strangers to his blood" and gave the proceeds arising
from a sale of the premises to the devisee over.
In the case at bar, it is not necessary to consider tho questions of
a conditioi.al devisa where there is no one named who is to take in
ease of the condition being broken, ncr to ipass uren a bequest of personality. But we do have before us the fact that in the former cases
the devise has been to a widow by a husband, and in the case at bar
the devise is to a husband by a widow.
By The Married Woman's Acts of 1893, Jun., 8th, P. L. 344, Paragraphs, 1 and 5, a married woman has practically the same control over
her own, property as has a husband, the resulting conditions being that
In either case the husband and wife must join in an absolute conveyance,
and either have the absolute right -to will their Individual property, subject in both instances to the rights _f curtesy and dower.
Considering the fact that since these acts, the married woman i:
given the same power over her property as the husband and the fact
that a devise of property by a husband to his widow with a conditioi
subsequent annexed, which on the breaking thereof, the courts sustained
as a valid condition, we are of the opinion that In the case at bar the
husband has violated the condition on which lie held his estate, and
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that the title became vested in Elizabeth Stayer.
We therefore enter judgment in favor of the defendant.
OPINION

OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The devise to John Fields was in fee, subject to the condition subsequent, that If he should ever mairy Julia Gordon, the land was to
pass from him to Elizabeth Staver, ber heirs and assigns forever.
A husband can give real estate to his widow, on the condition subsequent that she shall not marry any one, and this condition has repeatedly, been held valid. Com. v .Stauffur, 10 Pa. 350; McCullough's Appeal,
12. Pa. 197: Redding v. Rice, 171 Pa. 301. The courts have conceded
to the husband the right of so far indulging his dislike of his wife's
marrying again, as to make his devises to her defeasible by such second
marriage. He may be averse to having his property used in the support of a supersessor, or of the progeny of a supersessor;
and as Gibson, C. J., remarks, "It would be extremely dimcult to say why he should
not at liberty to indulge this aversion;" Com. v. .tauffer, supra.
Will the court grant the same indulgence to a wife? May she devising land to the surviving husband, condition the devise upon his refraining from another marriage? It would be brutal to make a distinction between man and woman. In a carefully considered English
case, it is decided that the woman can do what the mhan can. Since he
can condition his devise to her on her subsequent singleness, she can
similarly condition her devise to him. Allen v. Jackson, 1 Ch, Div. 399;
Stevers v. Gardner, 88 Io. 307.
The power to condition a devise to a widow, is not limited to cases
in which, upon remarriage, there is a limitation over of the estate; that
is, to cases of conditional limitation.
A condition subsequent, in
the strict sense of that expression, Is equally valid.
McCullough's
Appeal 12 Pa. 197.
In the case before us, however, there is, as
in Com. v. Stauffer, and Redding v. Rice. supra, a limitation over
Courts which held invalid conditions restraining any marriage, were
willing to concede, and did concede the validity of conditions against marrying certain classes of persons, or particular persons. Page, Wills, p.
409. The testatrix may have had good reasons for deprecating a marriage with Julia Gordon. The latter might have had improper relations
with him;
her character may hay been bad:
and her probable influence over the husband deplorable. The courts however will not sit In
judgment on the soundness of the donor's opinion about Miss Gordon.
The property was hers, and she could give or withhold it.
But independently of the general rower to condition a gift of land
on abstinence from marriage of a particular person, there is a power,
as we have seen, to condition a gift to a widcw or surviving husband,
on abstinence from re-marriage with any body.
Omne majus continet
in se minus.
Fields has married Julia Gordon. By that fact,, he has ceased to
be the own.er of the premises. They are now Elizabeth Staver's. He
cannot give a good title to Robinson, and is therefore not entitled to
receive from the latter the purchase money.
Judgment affirmed.
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BROWN vs. LITTLE.

Sc|. fa. sur. Mortgage-Power of Married Woman to Mortgage Her Land
for Husband's Debts-Act of June 8, 1893, Construed-Suretyship.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
This is an. action on a mortgage which was executed by the defenThe husdant, a married woman, under the following circumstances:
band of the defendant owed the plaintiff one thousand dollars and the
latter was pressing for a settlement. The defendant during a conference over the matter said "I will stand good for the money," and accordingly signed a mortgage of her land, for the amount, in which her
husband joined. It is now contended on answer to the sci. fa. that the
defendant. is not responsible under the mortgage. That the mortgage is
not binding.
Davies for the plaintiff.
A married woman may lawfully mortgage her separate real estate to
secure the pre-existing debt of her hu3band. Black v. Gehring, 24 Pa. 19;
Kuhn v. Ogilvie, 178 Pa. 303; Herr v.Reinoehl, 209 Pa. 483.
Bowman for the defendant.
Cited the Acts of June 3, 1887 and June 8, 1893.
The courts have not only refused to enforce such a contract against a
married woman, but have interfered to protect her from the result of her
action, when in effect if not in form she becomes surety for another's debt.
Real Est. Co. v. Roop, 132 Pa. 496: Patrick & Co. v. Smith, 165 Pa. 526.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
LAUD J.:-The case before us is a sci. fa. upon a mortgage given
by Mrs. Little to the plaintiff to secure a debt of her husband.
It has long been settled that a married woman may mortgage her
real estate for her husband's debt or for future advances to him. The
basis of the rule is stated in Kuhn v. Ogilvie, 178 Pa. 303. Nor does
the Act of June 8, 1893, P. L. 344 forbid hel doing so. This act is an
enabling act and is not to be construed as narrowing a woman's contractual capacity, except where the intent to do so expressly appears.
That section of said act which says a married woman "may not becomo
accomodation indorser, maker, guarantor or surety for another," has
been held to apply only to the technical contract of indorsement, guaranty or suretyship included in the words of the act. Dusenberry v. Ins.
Co. 188 Pa. 454, though it will be held to cover a manifest device to evade
the prohibition, as was the case in Patrick v. Smith, 165 Pa. 526.
But what th statute prohibits is the incurriv.g of a personal liability for the forbidden purpcse, a liability which carries the risk of genSuch is the liability
eral judgment. Herr v. Reinoehl, 209 Pa. 487.
in the case before us. The mortgage given by the defendant covers4
not only a portion of her real estate, but covers all of it.
In Stewart v. Stewart, 207 Pa. 68, it was held that the presumption
is one of surety, where the wife pledges her separate property to secure her husband's debts, at the solicitation of the debtor and the lender,
followed by the application of the money in payment of that debt.
It appears to us from the facts before us that the wife. the defendant in this case, is but a surety to the mortgagee for the husband. Zeller
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v. Henry, 157 Pa. 1; Stewart v. Stewart, 207 Pa. 59. So that although
it is true that a married woman may mortgage her property for the debt
of her husband, yet the courts have not only refused to enforce such
a contract against a married woman, but have interfered to protect her
from the result of her action, where in effect, if not in form, she becomes
surety for another's debt. Real Estate Co. v. Roop, 132 Pa. 496; Pat.
rick v. Smith, 165 Pa. 526; Stewart v. Stewart, 207 Pa. 59.
The defendant said to the plaintiff, "I will stand good for the money," and then signed the mortgage in question. What is the effect of this
contract but that of suretyship? The undertaking in suretyship is imand if not done, the
mediate and direct, that the act shall be done;
surety becomes at once responsible. Reigart v. White, 52 Pa. 440. The
as between him and
debt in the case before us is that of the husband;
The whole transBrown, tle ilaintiff, he alone was bound to pay it.
action is a transparent device adopted by the plaintiff and the husband
to create by form, a liability,
to evade an express statutory enactment;
when by law n.one in fact existed.
It Is conceded that this mortgage was given by a married woman. It
is not pretended that it was done in the management of, or for the benefit of her separate estate, or in the prosecution of any business in. which
On the contrary, if not given as
she was engaged, or for necessities.
surety for her husband, it was given upon his importunitv, and to aid him
in his business, one of the very perils from which the law ought to protect
a married woman.
Under the decisions as herein, quoted it is our opinion that when
the defendant said "I will stand good for the money" and then signed
a mortgage of her real estate s'le entered into what in effe:-t, if perhaps
As the Act of June 8, 1893,
not in form, was a contract of suretyshaip.
P L. 344, expressly says married women cannot become sureties, the
defendant, Mrs. Little is protected by the provisions of said act. Hence
the answer must he sustained and judgment entered in. favor of the
defendant.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
Mrs. Little's husband was already indebted to Brown, who was pressIng for a sottlement. when she told Brown that she would "stand good"
for the debt. Had the action been on this promise, there would have
(1) It would have been a prombeen at least three available defences.
ise without consideration. There w~s no agreement by Brown to
extend the time of payment, and he incurred no detriment of any sort.
Mrs Little gained nothing. (2) The promise was oral, to pay the debt of
another. It was not enforceable unler the statute of frauds. (3) Being
a promise to pay the debt of another, it created a suretyship which Mrs.
Litle, being a married woman, could not create.
But Mrs. Little did more than say that she would "stand good."
She executed a mortgage on her land. Even when a feme covert could
make no contracts Involving personal obligation she could make a mortgage of her land. She could do thi3 to secure debts of her husband,
nast as well as future debts. These mortgages were enforced in many
instances.
The act of June 8, 1893 was not designed to restrict powers already
evisting, of a married woman, but to Increase them. She bad at common
law, no power to make an ordinary contract for the payment of money,
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even when it was for her own benefit. The act of 1893 was -intended
to remove so much of this contractual disability as was not of the nature
of suretyship or guarantee. Suretyship or guarantee was allowed to stand
as it had been. The inability to enter into that contract was not a creature of the act of 1893; but it was a fragment of the commmon law Inability, allowed by that act to continue.
As prior to that act, a married woman could mortgage her property for her husband's dcbt, she can do so still. Seibert v. Valley Nat.
Kuhn v. Ogilvie, 178 Pa. 303; Du Bois Deposit Bank
Bank, 186 Pa. 233:
v. Kuntz, 175 Pa. 432. Stewart v. Stewart, 207 Pa. 59 teaches nothing
Inconsistent with these cases.
Judgment revcrsed, and judghent for the plaintiff.
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Much will be found in this beautifully printed volume. Of its varied
contents, the titles of its parts must here suffice to give an intimation. They are Jurisprudence, Histori al Jurisprudence, Comparison of the
Sciences, Abstract Jurisprudence. Legislation, Concrete Jurisprudence, Legal
Ethics. One is almost startled by the title of a chapter "Scriptural Law,"
and by the assurance that it is the office of the law "to carry into effect
the precepts of the Divine Law" etc., and to discover that statute law
Is conditioned not only by constitution, but by the law of God. "The
state cannot divest a man of a right with which God has endowed
him, nor relieve him of a duty required of him by the moral law." The
chapter on Legal Ethics contains an excellent statement of the principles of that topic. One cannot but regret to see in it, however, nearly two
pages devoted to the censure, at the distance of 3000 miles, of the conviction In England of a husband murderess, because apparently she happened to be "one of our American subjects." Judging trials at long range
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'Though a booklet of but 115 pages, this is well worthy of the notice
not rMerely of the student of the law of evidence, but of the practitioner.
ItQ purpose is wholly practical; viz., to state how to object to evidence
when offered in such a way as to becGme entitled to the court's exclusion
of it, if under the rules of evidence, It is Inadmissible. Expressing the ineptness of the objection so often made "it is incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial" the author concludes that "Incompetent" should never be used,
that "'mmaterial" and "Irrelevant" are synonyms, and therefore should
not both be used, and that when objection Is founded on some other feature than irrelevancy (or immateriality) that feature should be specified.
The analyses of the concepts expressed by the various technical terms,
the book is scientific in quality, and every
are distnat and accurate;
-to study It.
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